Digital ngerprinting has been much studied in the literature for more than twenty years, motivated by applications in copyright protection. A popular and practical approach is to use spread spectrum watermarking to embed ngerprints in multimedia objects. Solutions are normally only validated against known attacks in simulation.
Introduction
More than thirty years have passed since Wagner [Wag83] suggested digital ngerprinting as a means of copyright protection. Every legitimate copy of the copyrighted work is marked with the identity of the licensed user. If unauthorised copies ever appear, they can be traced back to the guilty source. Obviously, the mark, which we call a ngerprint, must be embedded in such a way that the users cannot remove it. The major challenge is collusion attacks, where multiple users compare their copies and make attacks based on the dierences between copies.
Following the pioneering work of Boneh and Shaw [BS95] , there has been substantial research into collusion-secure ngerprinting. Most works on ngerprinting assume (explicitly or implicitly) a layered model, consisting of a ngerprinting code (coding layer) and an embedding (watermarking) layer.
The ngerprinting layer can be described as a code, mapping user identities into codewords, or ngerprints, over some alphabet, and a decoding algorithm which makes the inverse mapping, also allowing for corrupt ngerprints. Studies on this layer typically assumes an abstract model, with a marking assumption which describes what attacks a collusion of users can perform. It is simply assumed that it is possible to embed the codeword symbol by symbol in a multimedia object so that the marking assumption is satised. A number of dierent marking assumptions have been proposed.
The embedding layer typically borrows a solution from digital watermarking, with spread spectrum watermarking (SS) being particularly popular. Additional care must be taken to make the system collusion-secure. It is common to combine spread-spectrum ngerprinting with well-known ngerprinting codes, such as the Tardos code [Tar05] , in spite of the fact that SS watermarking does not satisfy the Marking Assumption.
Practical ngerprinting systems in the literature are usually tested experimentally to assess robustness against known attacks. Theoretical analysis is not possible without some attack model, such as the marking assumption. It is interesting to note that the practical solutions use much higher code rates than we would require based on the theoretical analysis of the ngerprinting layer on its own. Equally interesting, there are few, if any, practical ngerprinting system which resist all currently known attacks.
In this paper we review some of the known ngerprinting systems and attacks, focusing on spread spectrum constructions. We analyse the MMX and Uniform attacks which has previously proved eective in simulations, and we demonstrate their ecacy mathematically. Finally, we provide a new mathematical framework to study the obfuscation technique which has thwarted the MMX attack in simulations [KS15] . A security proof for obfuscation remains an open problem, but we do identify some interesting properties which may be relevant for further research.
The ngerprinting problem
Wagner [Wag83] introduced a taxonomy for digital watermarking as early as 1983. A distributor is the authorised supplier of ngerprinted objects, giving authorised access to users. The opponent is an entity who makes unauthorised use of objects, through one or more users. The distributor's goal is to identify the user(s) whom the opponent has compromised. The opponent's goal, conversely, is to prevent the identication, even when the distributor is able to inspect objects which have been used in unauthorised ways.
Collusion-secure codes
Boneh and Shaw [BS95, BS98] introduced a model for digital ngerprinting in the presence of collusion attacks, i.e. when the opponent has access to the copies of several users. Creating a hybrid copy based on multiple objects, the opponent can hope to prevent identication. Each user is identied by a codeword, called a ngerprint, from some code C, and each symbol from the codeword is embedded in the ngerprinted copy. Extracting a ngerprint from a hybrid copy, the distributor can get a hybrid ngerprint. This is analogous to a noisy codeword in conventional communication. The Marking Assumptions denes the opponent's space of opportunity, i.e. the set of hybrid ngerprints which can possibly be created in an attack. It says that for each coordinate position i, the hybrid copy can only contain a symbol which is seen by at least one of the users.
Denition 1 (Boneh-Shaw Marking Assumption). Let P ⊂ C be a collusion of t users, and suppose they create a hybrid ngerprint r = (r 1 , . . . , r n ). Then ∀i = 1, . . . , n, ∃(c 1 , . . . , c n ) ∈ P s.t. c i = r i .
(1)
A code C is said to be collusion-secure if the distributor, observing the hybrid ngerprint r, can identify at least one user ngerprint c ∈ P. Boneh and Shaw also provided a code construction which is collusion-secure with bounded error probability. The Tardos code [Tar05] is a more recent construction with better code rate. His construction has been studied, analysed, improved and generalised by several authors [VCT06, AT09, NFH + 09, KC08, CXFF09, SKSC11, OSD13, ISO13]. Combination of the Tardos code with specic modulation schemes for embedding in multimedia has also been studied [XFF08] .
It is also possible to construct combinatorially secure codes, which always allow the distributor to correctly identify at least one user with zero error probability [SSW01, CS04] .
A number of alternative marking assumptions exist. Guth and Ptzmann [GP00] introduced a marking assumption allowing for random errors, meaning that the condition (1) could be broken in each position i with a bounded probability . This marking assumption is arguable much more realistic, because the watermarking system used to embed the ngerprint does not have to be perfect. The Boneh-Shaw code is secure also under the Guth-Ptzmann Marking Assumption with only a modest sacrice of code rate [Sch08b] .
The Marking Assumptions establish abstract models, and the problem of making practical systems which satisfy the assumption has received signicantly less attention than the construction of collusion-secure codes within the model.
Spread Spectrum Fingerprinting
Digital watermarking based on spread spectrum was proposed very early [CKLS97] , and many authors have further applied this to digital ngerprinting. As with collusion-secure codes, each user is represented by a ngerprint w i ∈ C, but now, the ngerprint is a real-valued signal, rather than a word over a discrete alphabet. The set C ⊂ R n of ngerprints is a a family of orthogonal or near-orthogonal sequences. The media le (object to be ngerprinted) can be viewed as a signal x ∈ R n , and the ngerprint can be added thereto, to give the ngerprinted object for user i:
for some embedding strength α.
On the receiver side, the decoder is given a noisy version y of the ngerprinted copy, and aims to recover the original watermark w i or the corresponding user i. A non-blind decoder knows the original work x, and can subtract it to obtain a noisy ngerprint
Thus, the original work has no impact on a non-blind decoder. A blind decoder does not know the original host signal x and has to treat it as additional noise to the ngerprint. This paper will only consider non-blind decoding.
The main constraint in SS ngerprinting is that the distortion must be negligible. More precisely, the ngerprinted copy y i must be perceptually indistinguishable from the original work x. A common measure for the distortion is squared Euclidean distance,
which is also known as the power of the ngerprint αw i . For particular classes of media, it may be possible to make perceptual models which more accurately measure the relevant distortion. In this paper, we will stick to power as the distortion measure, because of its generality.
The ngerprinting strength α scales the ngerprint to make a trade-o between decodability and distortion. When the decoder is non-blind, we can ignore the host signal x and assume α = 1 without loss of generality.
A simple and well-known spread spectrum decoder uses the correlation
as the detection score of user i. The decoder can output the user i maximising this score. Alternatively, a list decoder can output a set of users with scores above a given threshold. We observe that
because the sequences are near-orthogonal. Each sample, or co-ordinate position, in the watermark is commonly referred to as a mark in the ngerprinting literature. Note that the detection score is a sum of one term for each mark:
This is an important observation because it allows us to do most of the analysis based on a single mark. We will refer to the map w i,j → w i,j w k,j as the mark detection score.
In this paper we will focus on random binary sequences, to allow for simple proofs based on randomness. Each ngerprint w i is selected independently and uniformly at random over the alphabet {±1}. It is easily veried that the expected value E(s i (w j )) = 0 when i = j and the ngerprint w j is drawn at random. Thus (3) holds when the ngerprint length n is suciently large.
Other authors have studied random Gaussian ngerprints [ZWWL05] or orthogonal families [Kur12] . The same principles apply in all cases. Alternative decoding scores can also be found [ZWWL05] . Various techniques can be added to improve performance against certain attacks, such as interference removal [Kur12] and the preprocessor proposed in [ZWWL05] . 
A complete ngerprinting system
The ngerprinted objects are usually assumed to be images or media objects. Here we give an example of how spread spectrum ngerprinting can be applied to images. We consider the recent scheme from [Kur14] , as shown in Figure 1 . This design is typical for many systems in the literature.
The system consists of several key components. Following [HW06] and [Sch08b] , the modules are called layers. The coding layer (watermark generation) denes the code C of ngerprints. The watermarking (embedding) layer embeds ngerprints into host signals to create ngerprinted signals. Each of these components are parameterised by secret keys k 1 and k 2 . Finally, we need a layer to extract a suitable signal from the host objects (media les). In Figure 1 , this consists of taking only the luminance (grey-scale) component and making a frequency transform (DCT). The DCT transform means that the region selector can avoid the highest frequencies where the ngerprint would be vulnerable to noise attacks and image resizing, and also the lowest frequencies where the perceptible impact would be unacceptable. Observe that there is no secret key in the host layer. Therefore, in accordance with Kerckhos' (second) principle, we assume that the attacker can extract the same signal as the decoder, and apply the attack on the watermarking layer, and then reinsert the attacked ngerprinted signal in the host.
For each layer, especially the host and coding layers, there are a large number of proposed constructions in the literature.
The core element of the Watermarking Layer is the embedding operation. In this paper, we will only consider additive spread spectrum (SS) ngerprinting with nonblind decoder, as described in the previous section. Additionally, the Watermarking Layer commonly includes a region selector, which pseudo-randomly selects coecients to be used by the embedding operation. A key k 2 is used to seed the pseudo-random generator for this selection. The motivation for the region selector has been to make it harder for the opponent to know which coecients to attack.
For the coding layer, we will only consider a random binary code over the alphabet {±1} with correlation decoding. Other spread spectrum constructions are likely to have similar properties.
Attacks on Spread Spectrum Fingerprinting
Digital ngerprinting is concerned with two types of attacks, collusive and non-collusive. Non-collusive attacks include attacks known from other applications of spread-spectrum, such as additive noise (Gaussian or otherwise). Spread spectrum is very robust against such attacks.
Collusion attacks
It is natural to expect the attacks to be most eective when they are applied to the same domain as the embedding. Assuming that the opponent knows the system design, and only the secret keys are secret (cf. Section 2.3), he can extract the signal in the host layer, and apply the attacks to the ngerprinted signals y.
In a collusive attack, the opponent has access to a set of ngerprinted copies. Typically, the assumption is that the opponent is a collusion of users, each holding one ngerprinted copy, but it does not matter to the analysis how the opponent came by the ngerprinted copies. The colluding users are commonly referred to as colluders or pirates, and we use the term pirate ngerprints about the ngerprints embedded in the copies held by the opponent. The set of pirate ngerprints will be called the collusion.
The output of a collusion attack is not just a noisy version of one ngerprinted copy, but a hybrid of multiple copies with dierent ngerprints. Let P be a matrix with all the pirate copies as rows. We will only consider attacks which operate independently on each mark. Thus we can write the attack as a function a : c → z, where c is a column of P . The attack a is applied to every column to produce the hybrid ngerprint.
It is well known that SS ngerprinting is robust against a number of collusive attacks based on basic signal processing operations, such as minimum, maximum, and average (see Table 1 ). It is also robust against non-collusive noise attacks, such as AWGN, and against a combination of averaging and AWGN.
In contrast, SS ngerprinting is very vulnerable to two less well-known attacks, namely the MMX attack [Sch07] and the Uniform attack [Sch08a] . These attacks are dened as follows.
Denition 2 (Moderated Minority Extreme (MMX)). Let ∆ = a avg (c) − a mid (c). The MMX attack for a given threshold θ is dened as Denition 3 (Uniform attack). The uniform attack a U α with scaling factor α, (0 ≤ α ≤ 1) is a probabilistic attack. Given a column c it outputs a hybrid mark z drawn uniformly at random from the range a mid (c) ± αd i where d i = (a max (c) − a min (c))/2.
Classication of Attacks
The attacks, as discussed above, are applied to the ngerprinted copies, and one might assume that the eect depends on the host signal. This is not the case, at least not when the embedding is additive watermarking. We introduce the concept of homomorphic attacks. By abuse of notation, we take c + P for any n-dimensional row vector c and n × m matrix P to mean the matrix obtained by adding c to each row of P .
Denition 4 (Homomorphic Attack). An attack a is said to be homomorphic if it satises a(x + P ) = x + a(P )
for any collusion P and any signal x.
Homomorphic attacks can be studied independently of the host signal. If we let x be the host signal, and P a matrix with the pirate ngerprints as rows, then (6) means that the attack applied to the ngerprinted copies gives the same signal as the attack applied to the pirate ngerprints and then added to the host. In other words, we can ignore the host signal in the analysis of the attack. Remark 1. It is easy to conrm that all the attacks considered above (MMX, uniform, MAX, MIN, and average) are homomorphic.
Attack analysis
We consider a single mark. Both the attack a and the decoding score s is well-dened on each mark. Let x i be the mark seen by the ith pirate. The score associated with pirate i is S i = s i (a(x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x t )) = x i · a(x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x t ).
which is a stochastic variable with a probability distribution induced by the probability distribution of the random ngerprints, and also by the attack in the event of a probabilistic attack. All the attacks we have considered are symmetric in the pirates, so S i has the same distribution for all i. In the sequel, we omit the subscript i. Below, we shall nd E(S) under dierent attacks. The code is a random binary code over ±1. We will write X min = a min (X 1 , . . . , X t ) for the sake of brevity, and similarly for X max , X mid , X MMX θ , etc. Proposition 1. Let X i for i = 1, 2, . . . , t be uniformly and independently distributed over the alphabet {±1}. Let S = X 1 · a min (X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X t ).
Then we have
Proof. Both X min and X 1 are ±1, and hence S = ±1. With probability 0.5, we get X 1 = −1, and in this case, we always get X min = −1 and S = 1. With probability 0.5, X 1 = +1, and in this case, we get X min = +1 if X i = +1 for all i, something which happens with probability 0.5 t−1 . Otherwise X min = −1. Thus we get the following probabilities:
P(X min = −1, X 1 = −1) = 0.5 (11) P(X min = −1, X 1 = +1) = 0.5(1 − 0.5 t−1 ).
It follows that
P(S = +1) = 0.5 + 0.5 t .
We get E(S) = −(0.5 − 0.5 t ) + (0.5 + 0.5 t ) = 0.5 t−1 .
The variance is easily calculated using (13)(15).
Proposition 2. Let X i for i = 1, 2, . . . , t be uniformly and independently distributed over the alphabet {±1}. Let S = X 1 · a max (X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X t ).
The proof is similar to that of Proposition 1 by symmetry.
Proposition 3. Let X i for i = 1, 2, . . . , t be uniformly and independently distributed over the alphabet {±1}. If S = X 1 · a avg (X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X t ),
Proof. Spelling out the attack function, we get
The rst term is always 1/t. The expected value can be written as
and since E(X i ) = 0, we get E(S) = 1/t. The variance is given as
(20)
where V is the variance of a sum of t−1 stochastic variables, independently and uniformly distributed on ±1. Hence V = t − 1, and the variance follows as stated.
Proposition 4. Let X i for i = 1, 2, . . . , t be uniformly and independently distributed over the alphabet {±1}, and
Then
Note that if θ = 0, then the last term is zero, and E(S) 0. If θ = 1, then the second term is zero, and E(S) 0. Furthermore, E(S) is monotonically increasing in θ, so E(S) can be tuned by changing θ.
Proof. Let C denote the number indices i such that X i = +1. Obviously C is binomially distributed with t trials and trial probability 0.5. Write ∆ = X avg − X mid . We get
2C−t t , otherwise. To analyse S, we distinguish between three cases.
1. C = 0 or C = t.
3. other values of C, i.e. close to t/2.
Case 1 corresponds to columns where all pirates have the same symbol. In this case S = 1, and E(S|Case 1) = 1.
In Case 2, the MMX attack outputs the minority choice. If X 1 is part of the minority, then S = 1, otherwise S = −1. The probability that X 1 is part of the minority is i/t. Hence, we get
In Case 3, the MMX attack returns the average, and S = X 1 X avg . There is a useful symmetry in Case 3. If C = i is a Case 3 event, then so is C = t − i. It follows, that (X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X t ) = x is a Case 3 event, then so is (X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X t ) = −x. Furthermore, x and −x give the same score,
Thus, we can use an argument similar to the proof of Lemma 3. The score is given as
and the expected value is
The expected value of the score is the weighted sum of the conditional expected values
and the proposition follows.
Proposition 5. Let X i for i = 1, 2, . . . , t be uniformly and independently distributed over the alphabet {±1}, Let S = X 1 · a U α (X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X t ).
Proof. Note that with probability 0.5 t−1 , all the X i are equal. In this case X U = ±1 and X i · X U = 1 for any i. In all remaining cases, the pirates can see both +1 and −1 and X U is uniformly distributed on the interval ±α. Thus the expected value E(S|¬X 1 = X 2 = . . . = X t ) = 0. The lemma follows.
Discussion
The study of the expected value of the decoding score in the presence of attacks explains why the MMX attack is so eective. The expected score can be made negative. Averaging in contrast, is not eective. The expected score E(S) = 1/t declines only linearly in the collusion size t. The minimum and maximum attacks, as well as the uniform attack. are eective if the collusion is large, since the expected score E(S) = 2 1−t declines exponentially. There are other decoding techniques which make spread spectrum more robust against minimum and maximum, but these techniques are not eective against the uniform attack [Sch08a].
Modulation and Obfuscation
To our knowledge, there is only one technique which claims to thwart both the MMX and uniform attacks, namely the obfuscation described in [Kur16, KS15] . Previous works have applied obfuscation as one of several advanced features in a complex system, and evaluated the complete system only. Here, we will introduce obfuscation as a generic technique and analyse its merits theoretically.
Obfuscation and modulation
Obfuscation, as introduced in [KS15], is a new layer between the host and watermarking layers. This is shown in Figure 2 . The obfuscation key k 3 is used to generate a pseudorandom sequence s over {±1}. The signal extracted by the host layer is rst multiplied (element-wise) by s and subsequently subject to a DCT transform. The DCT transform is linear, and can be written as multiplication by the matrix T in the gure. Elementwise multiplication by s is equivalent to multiplication by the diagonal matrix S, with s on the main diagonal. Clearly S −1 = S.
In the original work, the host signal x was a matrix, and the DCT transform was two-dimensional. This does not aect the analysis. The 2D DCT transform can also be
From Host Layer To Host Layer written as xT for a vector x and some matrix T , although not the same matrix T as we would use for a 1D transform. In this paper, we will view the host signal x is a vector, and T can really be thought of as any invertible, publicly known matrix. Disregarding the region selector just for a moment, we can write the obfuscation and watermarking layers combined as
where x is the input from the host layer, w is the input from the coding layer, and y is the output to the host layer. Because the transforms are linear, the equation can be rewritten as
In other words, the obfuscation layer can equivalently be implemented between the ngerprinting and watermarking layers. In this case, we would prefer to let c denote the codeword from the ngerprinting layer, and let w = cT −1 S −1 denote the watermark to be embedded. Given a received watermark w , the receiver would calculate c = w ST in the watermarking layer, and pass the received word c for decoding in the coding layer. The region selector, which we disregarded in the discussion, can also be written as matrix multiplication, using a permutation matrix.
Denition 5. An m × n permutation matrix is an m × n matrix over {0, 1} with m ≤ n, where each column has at most one 1-entry, and each row has exactly one 1-entry.
Note that a permutation matrix R is semi-orthogonal, in the sense that RR T = I. In Figure 2 , the region selector multiplies the host by R T for some permutation matrix R. The reinsertion is also trivial, but not as neat. Multiplying by R leaves a number of zero entries, where the host samples which were not used for watermarking must be reinserted.
It is easier and more transparent to implement the region selector in the coding layer. In Equation (26) we can add a permutation matrix R to pad the watermark w with zeros corresponding to each unused sample in the host signal. At the receiver, R T removes the unused samples and returns the (hybrid) ngerprint. Thus
Applying the permutation R before the DCT transform T −1 means that we can use a relatively short codeword w, and have the energy spread across a longer host signal. Another approach to prevent attacks on the individual co-ordinate positions is modulation [KS15] , which is essentially obfuscation as in Equation (26) with a slightly dierent interpretation. If S ·T is an orthogonal matrix, which is the case in many implementation of DCT, we get
We can view (ST ) −1 as the codebook of spread spectrum sequences. When the encoder calculates w(ST ) −1 , it encodes each bit of w as an SS sequence, and these sequences are added together and embedded as one watermark. When the receiver applies the inverse transform ST = ((ST ) −1 ) T , it is equivalent to correlation decoding. Obfuscation and modulation as dened in (26) or (28) can be viewed either as part of the coding layer or as additional layers between the coding and watermarking layers. We make the following denition to facilitate comparison of coding layers with and without obfuscation. Denition 6. We dene a ngerprinting scheme to be a pair (C, d) of a ngerprinting code C and a decoding score d : R n × C → R. For any ngerprinting scheme, and any semi-orthogonal matrix U , we dene the obfuscated ngerprinting scheme (C U , d U ) where
The matrix U is called the obfuscation matrix.
Our previous construction [KS15] uses two layers of obfuscation, or, as we phrased it then, obfuscation in addition to modulation. Eectively this gives the following embedding of a codeword w:
where the S i are two distinct pseudo-random signature matrices, and R 2 is a pseudorandom permutation which also increases the word length by padding with zeroes. Each of these three pseudo-random matrices are determined by a distinct secret key. The R 1 matrix only pads the codeword with zeroes at the end. The rst DCT transform T 1 is 1D while T 2 is 2D. Clearly, this is equivalent to one layer of obfuscation using
as the obfuscation matrix.
Is obfuscation secure?
We have tried to answer this question analytically as well as empirically. To some extent the available results are contradictory, and they leave several open questions.
The main idea of obfuscation is to change the basis in which the ngerprint is represented. The MMX attack is designed to maximise the`attack noise' in each individual mark, which correspond directly to a co-ordinate position in the ngerprint (codeword). When the basis is changed as in (31) or (26), this correspondence is broken, and the attack noise in one mark, is spread across all the co-ordinate positions of the ngerprint.
Let us rst consider the correlation decoder in an obfuscated scheme.
Proposition 6. Let C be a ngerprinting code, and let d be the correlation decoder.
For any semi-orthogonal matrix U , the obfuscated ngerprinting scheme (C U , d U ) is equivalent to (C U , d).
Proof. The correlation decoder calculates d(r, c) = r·c, and the corresponding decoder in the obfuscated scheme calculates d U (r, cU ) = rU T · c. Applying the correlation decoder to a codeword cU ∈ C U we have d(r, cU ) = r · cU = r(cU ) T = rU T c T = d U (r, cU ), as required.
The implication of this proposition is that obfuscation of any ngerprinting scheme with correlation decoding changes the codebook only, and not the decoding algorithm. Most ngerprinting codes are random, and obfuscation then changes the probability distribution. Eectively, each symbol in the obfuscated code is a sum of random symbols, and in many cases the central limit theorem will apply, making the the obfuscated code a random code with Gaussian distribution. The MMX attack has previously proved eective against Gaussian ngerprints with correlation decoding [Sch08a] .
A study of obfuscation of other ngerprinting codes is beyond the scope of this paper. Suce it to note that an obfuscated Nuida code has proved eective in simulations [KS15] . Thus the change of basis evidently has some merit. Both single and double obfuscation (Equations (27) and (31)) resisted the Uniform and MMX attacks applied to the signal y. However, single obfuscation was circumvented by applying the attacks to a DCT transform of y, i.e. by using the attack
where a is the MMX or uniform attack.
Discussion and Conclusion
We have given a theoretical explanation to the ecacy of the MMX attack against spread spectrum ngerprinting, and provided a theoretical framework to analyse the obfuscation technique which we have previously proposed [KS15] .
Obfuscation of the Nuida code appears to prevent known attacks, if the obfuscation transform U has a structure which cannot be circumvented without knowledge of the secret key. It is still an open question if the current construction with two layers, each using a secret permutation, a DCT transform, and a secret signature matrix, will suce.
Obfuscation is equivalent to modulation by spread spectrum sequences, and this can potentially lead to a practical implementation of the Marking Assumption with Random Errors (as suggested by Guth and Ptzmann). Given the existing theory on spread spectrum, and on collusion-secure codes, it may be possible to get practical ngerprinting systems with formal proofs and bounded error probabilities. It is worth investigating.
